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A Review Of Perspectives And Policies On Food Security
Abstract
There are only two parts of the developing world where a massive problem of food insecurity exists, namely
South Asia and Subsaharan Africa. This is where a major portion of the poor in the world reside. Increased
attention to the developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have however diverted attention from
the problems of this poor humanity. The likely short term adverse effects of the proposed reduction in
protection of the US and the EEC agriculture on the food importing developing countries through the
increased cost of food imports has also not received the attention that it deserves. These adverse effects should
not be interpreted to mean that reforms in the agricultural policies of OECD countries are not needed, but
rather that they may call for special ameliorative actions in the short and medium run, especially in terms of
assistance to Africa. My comments below explore these relationships.
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Introduction
Perspectives on food security problems and policies seem to depend on a
country's position in the agricultural trading system (importer/exporter) and
their wealth. The following reports were presented in a Discussion Group on
Food Security which met at the International Conference of Agricultural
Economists in Tokyo, Japan during August 1991. Each presenter identifies a
unique food security perspective for developing countries, developed importing
countries or developed exporting countries.
The participants in this discussion are grateful for the contributions of
the following people:
Uma Lele (University of Florida, U.S.A.)
Shoichi Ito (Tottori University, Japan)
Ryohei Kada (Kyoto University, Japan)
P. Michael Schmitz (University of Frankfort, Germany)
Harald Von Witzke (University of Minnesota, U.S.A.)
O.L.E. Mbatia (University of Nairobi, Kenya)
These discussions were organized'under the auspices of NCR*151, a group of
economists Interested in dialogue on food and agricultural policy. The
helpful comments of members, especially Carl Zulauf and Milt Hallberg, are
appreciated.
Session 1: Food security Issues In developing countries
Presenter: Uma Lele, University of Florida, U.S.A.
Food Security; A developing Country Perspective
Uma Lele. -
A pres.entation made at .the Food Security Group
There are only two parts of ,the developing- world where a massive
problem.of .fopd insecurity exists, namely South Asia and SubsaHaran
Africa .This" is wHere. a major portion of the poor,- in the world
reside. Increased attention to the developments in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet,, Union, have however diverted attention from the
problems of' .this poor humanity., The likely short term adverse
effects pf/the proposed reduction-in protection of the-,US and the
EEC agriculture on the fpod-importing developing•countries through
the increased •cost of .food imports has also not received the
attention that it deserves. These adverse effects should not be
interpreted to mean that reforms in the agricultural policies of
OECD countries are not needed, but rather that they may call for
special ameli9rative actions in the short and medium run,
especially in te^s of assistance to Africa.. My comments below
explore these relationships.
Whereas the number of the, poor in-South Asia is estimated to be
nearly 300 million . according to the World Bank's 1990 World
Development Report due to overall economic growth it is estimated
to decline by year 2000. The^number-of poor in SubSaharan Africa is
by contrast estimated to be around 165.million by the same WDR, but
if the past .economic growth trends continue that^number is expected
to increase, by year 2000 to nearly 200 million. To the extent that
the problem of food insecurity is closely related to the problem
of poverty—a point, now generally acknoeldged;— the incidence of
food security is thus the greatest in these.two continents of the
world.; India which constitutes a major element of the picture in
South Asia ...is . marginally surplus in, food, production.
Notwithstanding the fact that much of the growth in'food production
in India has come from considerable amount of subsidization of
fertilisers, irrigation water and support for output prices, even
after withdrawal of subsidies proposed as part of the reform
program, India is expected to continue to be marginally surplus in
food production.-The problem of food^insecurity in India is largely
a problem -of inadequate demand resulting frohi a skewed income
distribution and inadequate growth of employment. India and South
Asia . have the ^necesary human and institutional- capital and the
knowhow to pursue .employment oriented policies. The problem in
India and South Asia is largely one of inade^quate; political will
and increased political instability that has diverted attention
from the pursuit of- growth oriented-.economic policies that will
also increase^incomes-and employment of the poor.-
The problem., of food insecurity in subsaharan Africa is more
complex. It could be characterised as a classic problem of
inadequate .supply as 'income and, employment in most African
countries including in . the'. nonfarm sector, is still largely
determined by the development of agriculture. Furthermore the food
sector constitutes a large portion of the agricultural sector in
Africa in terms of value added, employment, income etc.
Rapid urbanization and changing consumption patterns in Africa have
resulted in the substitution of rice and wheat in place of the
traditional food crops. Policies of import substitution including
in the agricultural sector until about 1985 resulted in a decline
in the volume of exports and a shift in emphasis in food
production from traditional crops to rice, wheat and sugar. Since
international food prices declined more rapidly than international
prices of many of the crops Africa exports, Africa would have
clearly been better off promoting the production of export crops
and meeting the growing demand for rice and wheat in which it does
not have a strong comparative advantage through imports while
encouraging the production of traditional food crops. The policies
pursued on the other hand increased demand while reducing import
capacity.
The developments in the international market including in
particular the proposed reforms of agriculutre in OECD countries on
the other hand are expected to increase international prices of
cereals which Africa imports. This should increase the cost of food
imports. This should not pose a serious problem provided the
structural adjustment efforts which have been aimed to shift price
incentives from nontraded to traded goods sector result in a strong
supply response, increase agricultural exports and import capacity
while exp^anding domestic income and employment. However the
evidence todate indicates that essential as structural adjustment
measures are they are not sufficient to achieve a rapid supply
response. There is a tremendous deterioration of agricultural
research, extension, infrastructure, credit and input supply
facilities that is limiting the supply response that price reforms
should prompt. Indeed if there is a major drought, food exports to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union continue together with reform
of the policies in OECD countries a situation similar to that in
1974 could well repeat itself for Africa with high World Food
prices, shortage of stocks and low import capacity to command them.
A review of the World Bank's various food security reviews carried
out in many African countries also suggest that with the exception
of Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Burkina Fasso food crop production
performance according to the World Bank's assessment has not been
rapid enough to compensate for the rapid growth in population and
the consequent movement to marginal lands associated with a decline
in food productivity.
There is no question that apart from an emphasis on increasing
export crop production Africa needs to give urgent attention to
increasing food crop production. The past experience suggests that
these food crop policies should focus on Africa's traditional food
crops, i.e. Sorghum, millets, cassava, yams and maize rather than
rice and wheat—although real depreciation of currencies could
result in increased comparative advantage in these crops. Policies
for food crop production also need to emphasize production in the
areas of greatest physical potential, emphasis on research,
extension, input supply and a price policy.
finally the growing numbers of the poor dependent on the market
call for targeted food subsidies to alliviate their food insecurity
and real income.
Session 2: The perspective of a developed Importing country
Presenters: a. ShSlchl Ito, Tottori University, Japan
b. Ryohei Kada, Kyoto University, Japan
HOW CAN JAPAN SECURE FOOD?
Shoichi Ito*
(August 19, 1991)
Discussion Group D-1
The 21st International Conference of Agricultural Economists
Tokyo, Japan
August 22-29, 1991
*Shoiclii Ito is an associate professior in the Department of
Information Science, Faculty of Agriculture, Tottori University in
Tottori, Japan.
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HOW CAN JAPAN SECURE FOOD?
by
Shoichi Ito
Introduction
The food security issue has been a long time major concern for
I
the Japanese. Recently, whether Japan should open the closed rice
market is under serious debate outside and inside the country. In
the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiation, Japan has been pushed
in the corner to open it, althougii there are unprecedented movements
from both producer and consumer organizations against opening the
market (Yamaji and Ito, 1?91).
Japan, which is one of the most economically advanced nations in
the world, has the lowest self-sufficiency rate at 48% among the G7
nations. How can a developed country such as Japan secure food? In
this paper, some future perspectives for an economically developed
country to secure food supplies are suggested using rice in Japan as
an example.
Real Rice Prices of Japan-and the World
Japan has achieved dramatic economic advancement since World War
II. The economic development of a country account for differences in
domestic prices relative to world prices over time. First, changes
in exchange rates, in particular, usually create advantages for the
economically advanced countries in purchasing foreign products.
Second, inflation rates are generally under control in developed
countries more so than underdeveloped countries. World rice prices
fluctuate much more widely than wheat or corn (Ito, 1990), However,
13
it is important to investigate the real rice prices of domestic and
world markets taking domestic inflation rates and exchange rates into
consideration. '
Table 1 shows inflation rates of the U.S..and Japan, exchange
rates of the U.S." dollar to the Japanese yen, and nominal Japanese
government rice purchasing prices and U.S. medium rice export prices.
Also, shov;ed in Table 1 are the real rice prices in terms of 19?0
U.S. dollar and Japanese yen values. Regarding real rice prices,
Japanese government rice purchasing prices declined over time, from
398,000 yen per ton (brown rice) to 306,000 yen per ton between 1960
and 1990, in terms of 1990 yen value. However, world prices, such as •
U.S. medium rice prices (FOB, New Orleans), declined more sharply
from 330,000 yen per ton to 43,000 yen during the same period. While
there was not much difference in the real prices between the two
nations in 1960, Japanese rice became six times as expensive as U.S.
rice in 30 years. In other words, U.S. rice became relatively
cheaper over time.
Production Instability
V . '
Agricultural production often fluctuates due to weather and/or
!
government policies. Yields are affected by adverse weather, while
yields generally increase due to technological advancement over time.
On the other hand, production can be controlled by the government; c
typically, acreage reduction programs implemented during years of low
market prices and excessive stock. Acreage reduction is manipulated
by the government, but the weather is beyond human control. Weather
may be the largest factor for crop failure. Unexpected continuous
poor crops due to bad weather eventually forced Japan to import rice
14
from S. Korea in 1984. Accordingly, there is a fear of food
I :
insecurity due to'low yields resulting from bad weather.
If yields in the world fluctuate more than Japan, Japan may
increase the level of insecurity by depending upon foreign products.
If, however, yields in exporting countries are no less stable than
Japanese yiel'ds, Japan may be able to increase the level of food
security by opening the closed market. While Fig.l shows rice yields
and trends for Japan and the U.S., Table 2 shows some results of
statistical analyses on the yields during 1964 and 1987. The results
indicate that situations between Japan and the U.S. are quite similar
to each other. Average yields are 5.6 tons and 5.2 tons of roughrice
per hectare (ha) for Japan and the U.S., respectively. Standard
deviations of the yields are 0.469 and 0.445 for Japan and the U.S.,
respectively, both of which appear to be statistically indifferent
from one another. Further, correlation coefficient between residuals
of trend lines were not significant, indicating no bad/good weather
happening during the same year in the different regions. The results
suggest that opening the rice market may bring"more stability in food
supply as long as the weather factor is concerned.
Are Rice Exporters Oligopolistic?
It is of interest to compare the concentration ratio of rice
exports relative to other grains such as vMieat and coarse grains.
Concentration of exporters can be expressed as the ratio of the
suppliers of the largest four suppliers relative to total supply in
the market (CR4) such as Marion (1986) and Scherer (1980) for
•I • ' : ^ J ' . 7. . - •
domestic industry studies. In this research, one and two country
- I • 1 '
concentration ratios (CRl and CR2) are reported as well. According
15 •
to the results for 1987 and 19?0, CRl for rice and wheat are quite
similar, while CRl for coarse grains is much greater. Regarding CR4,
however, wheat is nearly POT. while rice and coarse grains are at
around the lQ"f, level. Oligopolistic pov;er of large exporters in rice
should be much weaker than that of v/heat, if any. Recalling that
even wheat exporters have failed to organize an export cartel despite
such a high concentration ratio, it would be unrealistic to expect
rice exporters to exercise oligopolistic power.
Fear from Distrust
Some major concerns of the Japanese regarding opening the rice
market have been incurred from suspicion of the exporting countries.
One is food safety related to chemical application on the food during
production and after harvest. There are abundant reports on the
danger of the residues of chemicals for human beings. Another is
whether exporting countries will actually export food during a food-
shortage period and whether they will use food as a weapon. A food
embargo strategy is still one of the strongest choices of measures
used by the U.S. and other nations during the recent era.
While these concerns become larger as a dependency on imported
food increases, concerns are also augmented by an increase in
distrust between exporting and importing countries. The magnitude of
.such concerns may be perceived by an importing country as shown in
Fig.2. The curve may be called the "food-import-insecurity curve."
I
At 0 on the horizontal axis, there is no" imports, and all food
consumed is imported at Qf. The level of food insecurity increases
as food imports increase. In this figure, it is assumed that the
level of the insecurity concern is measurable in terms of monetary
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value. There may be curves with different slopes ai^d shapes such as
(a) and (b) in Fig.2. The curve (b) indicates that food insecurity
increases sharply at a small amount of imports.
On the other Iiand, the domestic supply cost curve in the
impoiting country is drawn as shown in Fig.3. As domestic production
increases, total production costs increase at an increasing rate due
to less productive land brought into production. Imagine that cost
per unit at a level being completely self-sufficient, Qf, is much
liigher tlian world prices.
Mow, put the two figures together and draw the total cost curve,
which is a vertical addition of the production cost curve and the
food-import-insecurity curve. This method was once designed for a
pollution control model by Freeman et al. (1973). The model in Fig.4
describes the current situation of the Japanese rice market. The
total cost is the lowest at Qt, where tliere are not imports but
exports as much as Qt - Qf. Namely, Ct, the lowest total cost, is
achieved when the country is not only completely self-sufficient but
exporting some extra amount. The food-import-insecurity curve has to
be shifted downward and be more L-shaped, before Japan can open the
market and eventually increase imports. Given that the insecurity
curve shifted downward and L-shaped as shown in Fig.5, the total cost
curve declined reaching the lowest point at Qt as imports increased.
And the total cost ct at Qt was even smaller than Cp indicating that
some impox"ts would cost Japan less in production per se tlian being
completely self-sufficient. In this situation, Japan would be
willing to import as much as Qf - Qt of food.
Implications for the Future Directions
17
The food-import-insecurity curve in Japan appears to be shaped
with -a steep slope like curve (b) in Fig. 2 indicating no imports
acceptable despite the high domestic production costs. Now, the
question is how to shift the insecurity curve downward and make more
L-shaped. There may be several ways to realize it, such as
development of new technology which would not require chemical
application in exporting countries, and improvement of mutual
understanding and enhancement of economic ties between exporting and
importing nations. One future direction to take might be
agricultural cooperation between producers from exporti-ng and
importing nations. Consumers tend to trust producers in their own
country. Taking this into consideration, the Japanese producers
should be encouraged to open up farms in an exporting country jointly
with producers in the exporting country,. This would, allow for, a
transfer of agricultural technology that the producers in importing
country are using. If food is produced by cooperative efforts in the
exporting country, people in the importing country would have more
trust in the imported foods. Further, a closed market is a type of
producer behavior protecting one's benefits established in the past.
If Japanese producers expand- domestic business to overseas, the
closed market system would turn out to be a barrier against
themselves.
In the U.S., agricultural operation is becoming more
international. U.S. agricultural land owned by foreign people are
shown in Table 3. . While .Canada,-.Germany, the Netherlands, and Great
Britain account for large shares, Japan holds only a few percents of
the total despite increases during recent years (USDA, November
19?0). In addition, these Japanese ownership is mostly engaged with
18
business investors and fo.od^ process ing companies from Japan. .The
point is that Japanese agricultural producers should be encouraged to
become actively involved with -the development of new agricultural
production in exporting countries so that they would take the
initiatives to smooth international agricultural trade.
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Table 1. Real rice prices of Japan and world, 1960 - 1990
A) World prices (U.S. dollars/ton, milled)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 -
World rice prices'- 179 183 190 419 496 383 344
CPI in the U.S. 36 38 47 65 100 131
160
Real world rice
prices (in 1990 dollar) 796 771 647 1,031 7 94 468 344
=^FOB prices at New Orleans.
Sources: IMF:International Financial statistics.
fRi .TaDrinese orices (ven/ton, milled basis)
1960 1965 1970 197 5 1980 1985 1990
Gov't. procurement'"
prices, 1000 yen 77 • 84 153 288 327 346
306
CPI in Japan 24 32 42 73
100 115 124
Real Japanese prices
(in 1990 yen, 1000 yen) 398 326 452 489 405 373
306
Exchange rates
(Yen/dollar) • 360 360 360 297 227 239
140
World prices
in yen (1,000 yen) 64 6 6 68 124 113
92 48
Real world prices in
1990 yen O/OOO Yen)" 330 255 • 200 210 140
99 48
sources: IMF:International Financial statistics. D, Food
%
Ministry of Agriculture
Aaencv: Data Related to
, Forestry and Fisheries imaci
Rice Prices, several issues.
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Table 2. Statistical results of U.S. and Japanese rice yields, 1964
1987.
(Metric tons'per ha, roughrice)
Mean . std. dev. Min. Max.
Japan .5.63 0.4(59 4.77 6.41
U.S. 5.21 0.445 4.59 6.33
Correlation coefficient^: 0.191
^This coefficient was estimated based on residuals'of yield trends in
the" two countries.
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Table 3. Concentration ratio of evporters f .
and coarse grains in 1987 and 1990! ^^ '^
1987
CRl
ca2
CR4
Rice
34
53
71
(%)
Wheat
31
54
89
Coarse
grains
57
65
78
-'-ilancl for rlc. a„C th. u.s. for
-3. for rice ana
for coarse grains EC-12 and Argentina
" "" y" >'«/«' lo.- .....t
source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (1988).
1990 (%)
Rice Wheat
Coarse
grains
CRl 32
29 54
CR2 52 56 60
CR4 74 87 67
and"th"e" s" fo^iiu Liie U.5. r i coarse grains
Coimtries in CR2 add to those in CRl the U.S. for rice the
U.S foi wheat, and Argentina for coarse grains
rice h" '^ "1 Vietnam and EC-12 for
2' ®V for w'leat and coarse grains.
• and'coars^grains"
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (April 1991 and July 1991),
22
Table 4. Foreign ownership of U. S,. agricultural land. 1986 and 1990.
(1, ,000 ha) '
1986 1990
self
Jointly
with^ US Self
Jointly
" with US
Canada 623
;
296 ,801 781
Germany 301 192 295 173
Netherlands 269 229 198' 224
United Kingdom 154' 1,429 126 999
Switzerland 96 112 ' 120 117
Panama 76 23 73 51
Liechtenstein '13 27 ' 59 94
Japan 46 12 71 147
France 30 122'' 36 421
others 479 431 428 626
Total 2 ,152 2,874 2,212 . 3,634
Japanese share
{
2.1^
,
0.4^ 3.2%
tJ --
4 . 0%
rource; DeBraaal (1987
I
and 1990)
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Fig. 2. Food insecurity curve in Japan
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Fig. 3. Production cost curve in Japan.
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Introduction
Trade policy is not made in the ivory towers
of acndeinia, nor do arguments grounded in eco
nomic logic always hold sway in trade negotiatioiis.
Political, cultural, sociological and other consider
ations may be.very often of equal or greater im
portance.
•- Inirecent years, Japanese agricultural policy has-
come under increasing criticism from both exter
nal-and internal sources. In September 1986 and
November 1988, actions were brought by the U.S.
rice millers to open Japanese rice markets. This,
occurred after general public opinion in Japan had
turned against Japanese-agricultural policy because
of the continuation ofunreasonably high price sup
ports for rice in 1986.
Since 1986,1 major Japanese consumer groups
have focused attention on broader trade-related
problems and solutions for Japanese agriculture.
Producer and cpnsujner differences have narrowed.
Producers have begun to consider the real needs
of consumers to gain a better understanding,of
what kinds of products are desired and in what
ways, th^y should produce and- market theni.
Consumer groups have coine to question their earli
er notion that rice trade should automatically be
liberalized if rice imports are much cheaper than
Japanese production.
In the current Urguay Round of the GATT
negotiations, the Japanese proposal stresses the
significance of "food security", based on the idea"
that at least "basic foodstuffs" should be -Jomes-
tically. produced. Some-Countries basically agree
' with the Japanese proposal, accepting the idea of
food security.^But many others, particularly the
United States and the Cairns Group countries, are
- strongly against-it..
Focusing on the food security issues, this paper
addresses the question of wliy Japan insists on
food security^ and why farmer and cotisutner
groups have .reconciled their positions. Using rice
as an example, the influence of non-econotnic fac
tors on-trade, policy is evaluated. The Intent is to
demonstrate that agricultural trade liberalization,
particularly of rice; will be difficult because of
widely-held and deep-seated cultural, social and et>-
vironmental values in Japan", while the benefits
to the economy of exporting countries are ratiicr
limited.
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•year
import prices .are cheaper than those in Japan"
(See Figs. 3 & 4).
The same public opinion poll indicated that about
two-thirds of the Japanese people feel "insecure"
about the future Japanese food situation. These
results suggest that a country which is heavily de-.
pendent upon food imports tend to be concerned
about food security.
I would like to stress, therefore, that the ration
ale for protecting domestic agriculture in food im- •
porting countries might be quite different from
that in food exporting countries. In the former
case, the supporting of domestic agriculture would
not directly distort the already existing interna
tional trade market. Exporting countries, on the
othei' hand, have recently faced a shrinking inter
national agricultural market due mainly to in
creased food production among developing and
planned-economy nations.
It is true the level of price support in Japan is
much higher thatmany other OECD countries, as
measured by the OECD's PSE (producer subsidy
equivalent) and CSE (consumer subsidy equivalent)
estimates. But when other aspects of agricultural
support by individual countries are compared, a
different picture may emerge. The current agricul
tural trade "war" is largely a fight over keeping
market shares, with combatants using direct and
indirect export subsidies. One could argiie that ex
port subsidies for the purpose of export expan
sion should be as strongly criticized as
protectionism in food importing countries.
Rice in Japan; A Multiple-Function
Commodity
I
Major arguments have recently been raised in
Japan for and against rice -trade liberalization.
•Some have strongly argued that Japan should open
the rice market to imports, at least for processing
and industrial uses. Many others, including agricul
tural cooperatives (producers) and consumer groups
positioned strongly against market opening. The
following are the most important points
30
Food Securily
3.1:'^ Should be supplied by domesiic
production as much as possible.
Should better be imported if
prices are cheaper.
;p.C|| Depends upon situations.
Do not know.
Fig. 3. Opinion about Desirable Food Supply Sources for Japan
Source: Prime Minister's Office: Public Opinion Poll on Food. Agriculture and
Rural Societies (Surveyed in September, 1984)
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feel insecure (31.4)
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Not much Never
Do not
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3.3
Fig. 4. Opinion about Japan's Food Situations in the Future
Source: Prime Minister's Office: Public Opinion Poll on Food, Agriculture and
Rural Societies (Surveyed in-September, 1984)
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son No. f)
offered in this debate:
(1) Price and Quality of Rice
- A major argument of those who favor rice trade
liberalization is based on the economic theory of
comparative advantage, which posits that cheap
er rice is beneficial to Japanese consumers and
that free trade yields better resource allocation
for the country as a whole. Those who oppose rice
trade liberalization have emphasized that import
ed rice is not necessarily much cheaper when
eating quality of rice is taken into account. Oppo
nents also suggest that international rice markets
might not he able to guarantee an adequate and
stable supply of quality rice which Japanese
people prefer, since the international rice market
is very "thin". Specifically, the amount of tradea-
ble world rice is very small compared to total world
production.
kg/year. person
UOr
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80
(2) Safety.of Imported Agricultural Products
A question raised by many consumer groups in
Japan is whether or not imported foods are truly
safe: how could saleguards against chemical com
ponents that mightbe hazardous to human beings
be maintained for imported agricultural products?
These questions are raised by consiuner groups
that are very sensitive to the safety and quality
of food. It should be noted, however, that they
have also criticized domestic productswhich might
also be contaminated by residual chemicals.
(3) Trade Friction Problems
The huge annual trade deficit of the United
States to Japan, which has amounted to over 50
billion dollars in recent years, is a major reason
for the increased U.S. pressure for greater liber
alization of trade. But as I have argued earlier,
even if Japan would open the market of all import-
60 Milk & Dairy Product^^.^..
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Fig. 5. Japan; Per Capita Annual Consumption of Major Agricultural Commodities.
1960-85
Source: MAFF; Food Balance Sheet
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restricted farm commodities; the problem,of a huge
trade deficit would not disappear. Consequently,
I very much doubt that trade frictions between
the United States and Japan would be eliminated
by Japan allowing unrestricted imports of ,U.S.
agricultural products. ^
(4) Impacts, upon Rice-based Agriculture in Japan
- Naturally, Japanese farmers opposed the idea
of trade liberalization for rice from the beginning.
They know that Japan cannot compete with the
United States or any other exporting countries in ,
t«rms of efficiency and .cost of rice production,
"lue to its disadvant^eous farmland conditions and
input costsi They believe that if rice trade
^ere totally liberalized,-significant portionsof pad-
fields in ,Japanwould be idled. This would most
seriously >affect medium and larger rice farmers,
most important policy target group in Japan,
^ose who would survive in this competition, wodd
likely be the so-called hobby farmers and/or part-
- rice farmers who .obtain stable off-farm
'ncomes.
(5) Impacts on Reponal Economies
Agriculture and its related infrastructure play
an important role in regional econonlies. In
relatively remote rural areas such as those in
Hokkaido andKyushu, where nonfarm employment
opportunities are relatively limited, the role of
agriculture In overall economic activity is very sig-
..nificant Since most every region of Japan includes
rice farming, the impact of rice trade liberaliza
tion would be widespread. At the international
price level of rice, even if rice quality is taken
into account, very few Japanese rice farmers would
be willing to continue rice production on a com
mercial basis. Furthermore,' the impact of the ex
pected rice price reduction would have serious
implicati9ns not only "for apiculture per se, but
also f9r the agriculture-related service industries.
Given the increasing unemployment rate in the in
dustrial and service sectors, the Japanese econo
my seems to have limited capacity to absorb those
persons from the farm labor force, mostly elderly
and female, who might be squeezed out from the
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agricultural sector. Probably for this reason, busi
ness anii industry interests in rural regions of
•Japan cend to oppose rice import liberalization.
(See Fig. o'i
(6) Kx"ernal Functions of Paddy and Rice Culti
vation
Paddy fields under the monsoon climate in Japan
play a significant role in protection from floods
and the conservation of soils by holding water.
Such conservation of natural resources has eco
nomic value beyond the monetary gains from
production. If most of the paddy- fields were to
be abandoned due to a sharp decline of rice prices,
the environmental cost would be enormous.
(7) Food Security Aspects
The self-sufficiency ratio of grains in Japan is
only 30 percent, the lowest level among major
developed countries. Most Japanese believe in self-
sufficiency for rice, especially under the present
situation where most other grains and pulses are
imported.
Some argue, however, that it is nonsense to
speak of self-sufficiencyof rice production because
the petroleum supply in Japan is totally from over
seas. But my opinion is that rice (as a staple food)
and petroleum are fundamentally different items
even if the present agricultural production system
in Japan is heavily dependent on petroleum. Pad
dy fields in Japan, which have been utilized for
thousands of years, possessessential values to so
ciety as one of the most precious natural resources
in Japan.
(8) Aspects of Rice Culture and Traditions in
Japan
Though obscure, a verystrong uneasiness about
rice market opening is related to the deeply-rooted
rice-based culture and traditions in Japan. Most
of the thanks-giving festivals all over Japan and
other cultural activities are even now connected
with the peoples' desire for a good harvest ofrice.
The value of cultural heritage, based on rice, pad
dy field and rural communities, is still alive and
vital to contemporary Japan, in spite of visible
modernization.
In summary, a discussion over the issue of rice
import liberalization reveals the following points:
those who oppose rice import liberalization em
phasize the significant values played, directly and
indirectly, by rice and paddy fields, such as the
importance to the regional economy. ej:cernr\i
bensl'ics. food security, and other environtnencai
and cultural reasons. Those who favor opening the
rice market tend to emphasize narrowly dei'ineti
economic benefits, for resisons of solving' trade
friction problems and increasing consumer henents.
As time has passed, more and more peupli: iiave
been inclined to support the former position. To
day, the discussion appears to relate more to so
cioeconomic and political elements than narrowlv
defined economic benefits.
The Size of the Japanese Agricultural
Market
One of the more debatable issues in agricultural
trade dispute is how much U.S. or Australian
agricultural sales to Japan would increase ii" Japan
opened its markets. This question becomes even
more important in light of the new trade agree
ment signed in Tokyo on June 20, 1988, by the
United States and Japan. In the agreement, Japan
consented to end all quotas on imports of heefand
fresh oranges in three years, and on fresh orange
juice in four years.
The real impact of the agreement is questiona
ble. A careful e.xamination of both short-run and
long-run export prospects, taking into account
Japanese food habits and likely U.S. shares of the
Japanese imported food marketplace, indicates that
U.S. sales revenues may increase about $1billion.
' While this would expand U.S. farm imports to
Japan by almost 20 percent, it v.*ould do little to
balance the overall Japanese trade surplus with
the United States,which ran at $52 billion in 1987.
Consequently, the Japanese position is that fur
ther trade liberalization has more of a symbolic
than a substantive meaning. While this does not
deny the need for the Japanese government to
make further efforts toward the reduction of im
port barriers, the potential benefits to the United
States must be placed in the proper perspective.
U.S.-Japan agricultural trade has been and will
continue to be very sizable, stable andcomplemefi*
tary. Japan is the largest customer for U.S. agricul
tural exports. During Fiscal Years 1985-87, U.S-
farm exports to Japan averaged nearly $5.5 bi •
lion annually, 19 percent of total agricultural
exports.
3^
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Presently, Japan draws about one-third to one-
its cotal domestic use of grains and pulses
rroin che United States. Tlie Japanese people some-
ames overlook this fact. On' the o^ther .hand, it
jeenis that (J.S. people often presume that, due.
r.o exceptionally .high protection of ,Japanese"'
affricuiture, only very small amounts of agricul
tural products are e.xported to Japan. Effects to""
miiiimize the perception gap between the two coun
tries appear to be essential to irnprove.trade rela
tionships. .
The new U.S.-Japan trade agreement'does not
affect Japanese restrictions on rice imports. Gains
to che United States from liberalized Japanese rice
trade are potentially greater than from expanded
beef and cicrus trade. But potential gains are often
overstated..
Professor C. Pearson estimated the e.\pected im^
pacts of U.S. rice e."<ports to Japan under an as
sumption that the Japanese eliminated rice trade
restrictions (i.e., complete liberalization of the
Japanese rice market). His estimates show that
(1) U.S. rice exports would increase by 2.45 mil
lion tons, and the export value would increase by
S655 million. (2) Japanese rice production would
fall by 3.87 million tons and imports from the
United States wouid rise to 4.60 million tons. These
estimateshave been subjected to considerablecriti
cism because the price elasticity values used in
the model are questionable.
There is little reason to expect that the United
States would capture most of the Japanese rice
fnarket with trade liberalization. The United States
's a relatively high cost producerof ricecompared
to Thailand, China, and other potential rice ex-
I^rters in Asia. In recent years, the U.S. govern*
'"ent has guaranteed its rice producers a support
price that is two to three times the world market
pnce. This means that, without large amounts of
government support, the United States could not
the game of international rice market compe
tition.
U.S. position is stronger in the case ofbeef,
's is partly because Japanese beef demand is
®*pected to increase more than the demand for
®r meats. It is also because the United States
supply relatively "high quality" beef to Japan,
ranges could be even more easily liberalized
beef. This is because the Japanese tangerine
(Mikan) is considered a differentiated product from
U.S. Nazval and Valencia oranges, and the present
level of imports is believed to be close to what
would be expected under free trade.
The United States is pushing hard for the com
plete, immediate liberalization of 22 items currently
subject to residual import quotas in Japan.
However, compared with beef and oranges, most
"of these are relatively minor Items' (except for
starch and dairy products) in terms of their rela
tionship to food security, therefore, if liberaliza
tion couid be a'dopted'simultaneously with domestic
farm policy reforni, the elimination'ofcurrent trade
restrictions for these commodities would not be
strongly resisted.
Seeking Global Solutions
The History of agricultural production in the last
several decades seems to be characterized by over-
reaction, over-production and over-expectations.
National domestic agricultural policies, on the other
hand, have usually attempted to avoid adjustments
to changing world market conditions. They are still
geared to encouraging output expansion, even
though additional output is not needed. As world
trade growth has slowed, over-capacity has erupt
ed into trade disputes as each country has attempt
ed to avoid adjusting its own agricultural system
to meet the changing international market sit
uation.
Hence, in order to tackle current world-wide
overproduction and financial problems in agricul
ture, solutions must focus on how to reduce the
structural imbalance of supply and demand exist
ing in the world market. A reduction of the dise
quilibrium and instability prevailing on the current
world agricultural market is imperative.
Concerted and harmonious joint efforts are need
ed amongboth exportingand importing countries.
Efforts must be made to decrease the current
stocks of major agricultural commodities in the
short run, and then to prevent the resurgence of
these imbalances in the long run.
To this end, new international trade rules must
include: (a) a better system to prevent overproduc
tion; (b) a change in income support measures (for
disadvantaged areas and/or countries); and (c)
improved domestic production systems, more
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sensitive to world market forces.
In particular, the following three general princi
ples should provide a basis of achieving such via
ble new crade regulations: First, the new rules
should not attempt to impose a uniform agricul
tural system, since many countries will, insist on
individual systems for lee^itimate reasons. Second-,
ly, farm output should not be further increased
in response to artificially supported prices, partic
ularly those elevated by export subsidy programs.
And thirdly, programs which seriously distort
domestic consumption and production patterns
should be atler'?d.
Since current, overproduction and world diser
quilibria are mainly caused by high subsidies in
exporting countries, the coming GATT negotiation
should discuss means of reducing export subsidies.
First of all, member countries should have an
36
agreement on the freezing of subsidies at currni
levels. The next step should be the gradual reduc
tion of remaining subsidies, say in five to ten years,
Multilateral action on production quotas may be
necessary to achieve a healthy world grain market.
As for Japan in particular, there are many things
to be done as well. In addition to the existing poli
cy reforms of 1986 to revitalize and restructure
Japanese agriculture, Japan should also bear pan
of the cost to reduce huge surpluses and to con
struct interrational food security system. One me
ans of accomplishing this would be a temporarj'
measure under which Japan purchases some
amount of surplus grains to use either as food aid
to needy LDCs or to augment government resen-'es
of grains (which could eventually be used as feed
grains). In any event, Japan cannot assume a po
sition of "this is none of my business."
Session 3: Viewpoints of developed exporting countries
Presenters: a. P. Michael Schmltz, University of Frankfort, Germany
b. Harald Von Wltzke, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.
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Do Developed Exporting Countries Contribute to Food Security?
The Case of the EC
1. INTRODUCTION
The representatives and advocates of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of
the European Community (EC), a major exporter of food and agricultural commodities,
claim that (a) food security has already been achieved domestically for a long time as an
unambiguous result of a well-defined and successful agricultural policy design, and that
(b) their countries even provide abundant food for needy regions in the developing
world, thus alleviating food insecurity abroad. Looking at the tremendous production,
export, and stock volumes in these countries this statement seems to be supported at a
first glance. In this paper it is argued that EC's agncultural policy has, in fact:
contributed little if at ^1 to domestic food security and is obviously not able
^ to avoid newly arising poverty and hiinger for some minorities;
aggravated the efforts of providing people with enough food at reasonable
prices in the developing world.
Before starting the discussion on these hypotheses in Sections 3 and 4, it is
worthwhile to give a precise definition of what is meant by food security, to develop an
indicator with which one can measure food security, and finally to derive a conceptual
framework for evaluating different degrees of food security (Section 2). All three aspects
will be discussed and analyzed as general as possible in order to make the food security
approach applicable for rural and urban poor in both developing (LDCs) and developed
countries (DCs). The paper does neither provide any quantitative estimations of food
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security levels, nor does it discuss poli(7 options for copingwtti the food security issue.
Rather, it attempts to improve the theoretical'foundation, to develop some'alternative
indicators, and to apply botli to the mentioned hypotheses; More specificially, some more
recent developments in the field of appliedwelfare'econoniics are'introduced which, in
the author's view, have been under-utilized iriTood security i^esearch. This kind of
analysis might especially be useful for comparisons of food security levels, between^
households," regions, and countries as well as'^ for giving a basis on which national-and
supranational funds can be allocated'to'the poor. •
2. DEFINITION. MEASUREMENT. AND EVALUATION
"Food security is access by all people at all times to enough food for* an active and
i -i'l . '•
healthy life" (World Bank, 1986). This definition which seems to reach the highest rate
of acceptance among concerned researchers implies that (see Phillips and Taylor, 1990,
p. 1304):
food is available, accessible, affordable - when and where needed - in
sufficient quantity and quality;
an assurance is given this state of affairs to be reasonably expected to
continue.
Moreover, this widely accepted definiti9n reflects the shifts from
a production orientation to a consumption and health focus;
country-leyel to household- or individual-level analysis;
a solely quantity point of view to both quantity and quality issues;
static or cross-section analysis to dynamic analysis over time;
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" .. merely transitory to transitory and chronic malnutrition.
It has been noted that national food security does.not imply household or individual food
security (Staatz, D'Agostino and Sundberg,, 1990, pp. 1312-1316) and; that food security
today does not imply .food security tomorrow. The most important result from previous
research, however, has been the observation that not an, inadequate level of food supply
causes hunger but a lack of individual purchasing power or- real income (see also
Chisholm.MdTyers, 1982, p. 5). Hence, indiyidual poverty is the driving force behind
hunger and malnutrition. This makes clear, why food insecurity is not restricted to, poor
countries. Even in rich countries a small but growing group of the population do not
have access to sufficient food (Allen and Thompson, 1990, pp. 1162-1163; Phillips and
Taylor, 1990, p. 1304) because their real income falls below the poverty threshold.
* 'I ' •
With this causal relationship in mind, the question arises under which
preconditions individual real income or real household income could be an adequate
basis for the measurement of food security. Obviously, a minimum of that income is
required to meet individual's needs. Aminimum level of real income can also be
interpreted as a minimum right to resources in the sense of Atkinson (1991, p. 8) which
enables individuals to participate in a particular isociety, as a guarantee of positive
freedom." As a rule of thumb the poverty or the food security line in developed
countries is estimated to be that disposable household income which is less than 40 to 50
percent of the national average, thus implying a relative measure. In Developing
Countries it would make more sense, however, to define a fixed amount of real
purchasing power which enables individuals to have access to enough and healthy food.
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When calculating this real piircH^ihg power it" has to be Icept in mind that income
in-kind has to be added (i.e., home produced goods and services) and a discount for non-
available or rationed food should be subtracted. But even when these problems are
solved three additional aspects warrant further attention:' the-relevant' time period
considered, the choice of equivalence scale in case of different'household sizes, and how
food intake corresponds to income'. Whereas the measurement of poverty is'generally
based on cross-section analysis per year (Atkinson, 1991, pp.' 5-17), the proposal here is
to use time series analysis of real household income in order to capture seasonal
variability and life cycle variations includirijg complete breakdowns of income (see aiso
Ravallion and Huppi, 1991, pp. 57-82). The choice of the time unit (daily, weekly,
monthly, annually) should depend on whether "different options of dissaving, borrowing or
participating in income streams of related people are available. If there aren't any risk
sharing private or official institutions, thien a daily-based income report would be the
best. Depending on the size of the household, the age structure of its members, the
distribution between male and female, the degree of handicaps of people, and their
nutritional and health status, the required minimum household income (food security
line) differs widely. Buhmarin arid other's (1988, pp. 115-142) therefore propose an
adjusted income indicator (y^dj) to make food security or poverty levels of households
comparable and to take into account the above mentioned aspects:
Xadj = real household income / n^ "
where n denotes the number of members of the-household and s is the elasticity of
family need with respect to family size. The equivalence scales are based on subjective
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evaluation and in the poverty literature this ranges from 0.25 to 0.72 (Atkinson, 1991, p.
15). Finally, what can be ssdd about the correlation of real income with food,intake and
the nutritional and healthy status of individuals? Fortunately, recent contributions in the
literature show,a strong positive relatipnship between income and nutrition implying that
nutrition and health are improving with income growth (Schiff and Vald6s, 1990, p. 1320;
Von Braun, 1990, p. 1323). Faced with a lack of data concerning,the deternunants of the
nutrition ^d health production functions, the real household income might therefore
provide an acceptable basis for the measurement of food security example of how to
calculate this real income indicator for Sub-Saharan Africa is given in Sahn and Sarris,
1991, p. 262).,
So far only the level aspect of food security has been addressed. The level of real
household income should not fall below a certain target or imnimum level, However,
food insecurity reflects the adverse effects of an uncertain world as well. Hence, we
should also look at the fluctuations of re^ household income around its mean trend.
Formally, this is the probability distribution of real income over time thatmatters and it
should be the objective of any food security policy to keep the probability of real income
falling below the target level as low as possible at reasonable opportunity costs. Then
one can measure food insecurity as the probability (a) of real income falling below the
critical level y* (see Figure 1for illustration).. The food security level (FS) is then:
y' - E[y]
(1) FS = 1 - Prob
where
F(y)< — or 1 - a in Fi^re 1
44
Prob probability-
- E expectation operator " ' .
var variance
y ~ Yadj adjusted real income ' . .
y* ^ minimum income
F(y) standard normalized cumulative distribution function
For practical purposes the first (mean) and second (variance) moments of the probability
distribution can be used to calculate the degree of food insecuritywhich ranges from
zero to one. In that case the implicit assumption is made that real income fluctuations
are normally distributed. ^ i
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Figure 1. Measurement of Food Insecurity
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So far we have only addressed the positive questions of measurement. Nothing has
been said on the evaluation of different probability distributions in welfare terms or how
food security does correspond to individual welfare measures, Normatively speaking, i.e.,
does the individual prefer the probability distribution B over A (Figure 1) although food
insecurity increases (a plus shaded area)? The answer to this question depends on the
weights the individual gives to mean, variance, skewness, and other, moments in his/her
preference function^ Hence, econoimc agent would prefer B over A if and only if the
level increasing benefit outweighs the risk loss neglecting higher moments. The most
common practice of economic analysis in such cases has become to,apply the expected
utility approach or the stochastic dominance approach (see Dillon and Anderson, 1990,
pp. 120-157). In the following well use the former assuming a normal distribution of
real income which leads to a simple mean-variance formula of expected utility of income
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p. 85):
, 1
(2) E[U(y)] = E[y]-% •A-var[y]
/ *
A coefficient of absolute risk aversion
U utility ' . : •
This equation is especially useful as a complementary tool for evaluation of food security
because it
~ contains both mean and variance of income as arguments, thus considering the
stochastic nature of the problem;
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-- can be applied to producers, consumers, arid other'agents such as taxpayers
and politician;
- contains the risk attitudes of market agents;
allows comparisons over time arid aihong agisnts of situations with a different
extent of food insecurity;
" provides a reasonable money measure of food security costs and benefits.
I
We are now in a position to define, to measure, and to assess food security or food
I
insecurity, respectively.' Hence, the question can be answered: What is the contribution
of the CAP to domestic food security? |
3. COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND DOMESTIC FOOD SECURITY
Agricultural Price Policy in the EC implies an average increase of producer prices
i
over their free market levels, a considerable stabilization of prices compared to the
I
world market (see Table 1), and finally a distortion of the price pattern in favor of
grains, milk, beef, and sugar beets. These market interventions will be evaluated, from a
producer's and consumer's point of view.
I
3.1 Producer's Welfare and Food Security
The impact of this; price policy on producer's welkre can be measured by the
expected utility of an indirect profit function (see Just^ Hueth and Schmitz, 1982^ p. 349):
(3) E [U (t)] = E [U (TT {p; V, K})] ' • •
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Table-1. Variability^ of Genn^ Food Import Prices -- 1970-1985
Products
Price Variability (%)
Imports from
EC-Member Countries
Imports from
Third Countries
' ' 1 1 ,
Grains and Cereal Products 5.6 17.9
Milk and Dairy Products 3.4 65
Swine and Pork 9^ 7.7 •
Cattle and Beef' 73 16.4
Poultry and Poultry Meat 6.0 • . 4.9 .
Eggs and their Derivatives 11.5 17.2
Single Products
Wheat 5.8 24.5
Barley 6.4 213
Com • " ' • 6.1 17.9 • '
Soymeal - ' • "183 ' 21.4
Rice 93 . . 21.6
Raw Sugar 43 62.2
Cattle ' 6.2 13.5
Swine . 8.1 • 14.4
Butter 43 323
Source: Own Calculation onBasis ofGerman Agricultural Statistics (see Schmitz, 1987, p. 366)
^Measured as Trend-Corrected Coefficient of Variation Following the Approach ofCuddy and Delia
VaUe, 1978, pp. 79-85.
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which is homogenous of degree 1 in prices and has the following properties (Hoteling's
Lemma):
— = > 0 ; >0; = Xd>0; > 0
3p 3p^ dv dv^
where
J^T indirect profit' ' -
p producer prices
V factor prices
quantity vector of fixed inputs''
q^ output supply
Xjj input demand
Using the simple mean-variance approach of equation (2) and the approximation
procedure for both moments following Mood, Graybill and Boes [1974; p. 181, see
equations (19) and (20)], one can easily derive a money measure (s ceitaihty equivalent
indirect profit) for the expected utility of profits leaving the variance of4nput prices
unaffected by policy:
(4) E[U (ir)] « V, K) + -(cvP •e -(Rev)- ^•R•cv ^ ^
where
p, V mean prices - :
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cv coefficient of variation
e supply elasticity
Rev Revenue
R coefficient of relative risk aversion
The first term on the RHS of equation (4) is that level of profit where prices are at their
mean. A mean preserving spread of producer prices, however, creates two additional
terms in equation (4). The second term on the RHS is equivalent to an increase of the
expected profit under fluctuating prices from which the producer obviously benefits,
whereas the third term addresses the producer's risk attitude. A risk averse producer,
i.e., would face a loss of welfare under fluctuating prices. The producer gains from pure
« I
price stabilization under the Common Agricultural Policy if, and only if
(5) R > e
Rev
which is likely the case assuming plausible parameter values.
Since the mean profit change is also positive, the producers welfare position has
been clearly improved by.the CAP.
Referring to the food insecurity status of producers under the CAP, it has to be
stated that the probability (Prob) of real profit (tt) to fall below the critical level (tt*) has
unequivocally been decreased since the mean is up and the variance is down:
(6) Prob
TT* - E [jt]
F (t) < .
var [jt]
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Hence, price support as well as price stabilization under the CAP'have improved both
the welfare position and food security'of farmers although the benefits "seem to be very
unevenly distributed among different farms and regions (see vonWitzke, i979; Tarditi
and Croci Angelini, 1982). . . ,
3.2 Consumer's Welfare and Food Securitv
Analogous to the producer case, the impact on consumers should be measured as
V
the expected utility of equivalent income or money metric (MM):
* i, ' ' • -
(7) E[U(MM)]
I • • • ^
Money metric itself can be defined as that level of income needed at some vector of
reference prices (po) in order for the consumer to attain the same utility level he/she
enjoys from income Yq when faced with price vector (pi). In other words money metric is
» ' ' I '. •' " r • • I ''
the sum of the initi^ income (yo) and the equivalent variation (EV). Since the
equivalent variation from a pure price change can be derived from an expenditure
function (e[*]) as (see Boadway and Bruce, 1989, p. 205):
(8) EV = e (po, Ui) - e (pi, u,).
for the money metric it follows:
(9) MM = Yo + Ae(p,a)
where the e)£penditure .function is increasing with prices and utility, is homogeneous of
degree 1 in prices, is concave in p, and has the following property (Shepard's Lemma):
5e (p, ff) ' • '
— = q^^ (compensated demand function)
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dUsing again the simple mean-variance approach of equation (2), the Mood, et. al.
approximation procedure for the mean and the variance of the money metric, and
rearranging some terms, yields:
(10) E [U (MM)] » Yo + ^5 cv^ 1M'^ l EX - !s R cv^
where
compensated demand elasticity (= n + s >.)
s budget share of products with fluctuating prices
k income elasticity
T) (uncompensated) demand elasticity
EX mean expenditures for products with fluctuating prices
The interpretation of equation (10) is analogous to that of equation (4) for the producer.
In accordance with the considerations of Helms (1985, pp. 93-100), the expression in (10)
could be called the ex-ante equivalent income. The consumer finally gains from pure
price stabilization if and only if:
(11) R > \n'\ /s
which is again likely to be the case as Turnovsky, et. al. (1980) state, although the
relative gains seem to be negligible (Wright and Williams, 1988, pp. 616-627) due to the
low food share in consumer's budget. Thus, even with equal coefficients of risk aversion,
producers might be more heavily affected by fluctuating prices than consumers.
However, the central question of how the CAP affects mean and variance of
consumer prices has been left unanswered so far. The answer very much depends on the
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- transmissionrof-price impulses from-the wholesale to the retail-level. Empirical studies
I I
show the EC consumers to shoulder the full burden of the price,support at the.wholesale
level because the potential for replacing price increasing intermediate food or for
substituting final food consumption is very limited (i.e., Schmitz, 1987, pp. 368-370) and
the CAP covers nearly the whole range of food items. In addition, the CAP contributes
little to consumer's price stability. The statistically observed stability already exists due
to high proportions of stable non-food inputs in food value added, to partly anticyclical
margin behavior over time, and, to risk! transferring mechanism for which consumers are
obviously willing to pay. Surprisingly, the level of stability of final food prices hardly
'1
differs among products, irrespective of| the fact that some wholesale prices or producer
prices are subject of the CAP andjOthers not (see Table 2). Hence,,the CAP has.not
only weakened the welfare position of consumers but has also increased the level of food
I *
insecurity. This is in contrast to policymakers' claims. It holds especially for those
consumers who spend a large portion of their budget on food, namely the,older
generation, families with many children, and unemployed people. The low real income
of those mihoritiies is eroded further by-the CAP. ^ ^ ^
Nevertheless, some advocates niight still argue that for a vast majority of people
food security has already been provided. That is true. But this has not been caused by
the food and agricultural policy. Rather, it originates from the overall performance and
efficiency of the economy. Thus, it is fair to say that food security for most people exists
despite the CAP.
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Table 2. Variability'' ofGerman Food Prices at Different Stages in the Food Chain 1970-1985
Price Price
Product Variability (%) Product. • Variability (%)
Swine 8.1 Cattle 6.2
Roast Pork •" 9.4 Roast Beef 4.2
T.ard 3.1 Fillet of Beef 4.1
Ham • • • : . ' .2.1
Poultry 5.3
Calf . . 6.5 . Broiled Chicken 3.6
Veal Cutlet 8.4 "
Raw Milk 4.8
Eggs from Producers 6.4 Fresh Milk 4.4
Eggs Packing Incl. 5.7 Butter 4.3
; .• Cheese 4.6
Wheat 5.8 ' Sugar Beets ^ - 6.9
Wheat Flour 3.2 White Sugar 4.3
WUte.Bread 3.2
White Cabbage 33.1
Rye 6.4 Cabbage with TraderMark 14.0
Rye Bread 2.5 Cabbage in Cans 4.9
Potatoes from Producer ' • '42.2 • Red Cabbage - • - 42.8
Potatoes Packing Incl. 24.5 Cabbage with Trade-Mark 15.5
Potato Salad 5.0 'Cabbage in Cans '' •4.8
Potato Chips 2.4
Must 20.3
Apple from Producers 36.6 Red Wine 2.8
Apple with Trade-Mark 15.2 German Champaign 6.8
Apple Juice 7.2 ' Braindy 4.2
Apple-Puree 5.6
•
Source; OwnCalculation on Basis of GermanAgricultival Statistics (see Schmitz; 1987^ pp. 363-364).
'^Measured as Trend-Corrected Coefficient ofVariation Following theApproach of Cuddy andDelia
Valle, 1978, pp. 79-85.
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4. COMMON AGRTCTJT.TURAL POLICY AND FOOD SECURITY IN LDCs
A vast literature exists on the impact of the CA? or similar agricultural policies of
other industrialized countries on world markets and on developing countries (i.e.,
Anderson and Tyers, 1990; Hartmann and Schmitz, 1991). The focus has been on price
level induced welfare effects in the third world. However, only few studies have '
addressed the question of how to evaluate the price transmission with respect to"
variability of certain domestic variables, such as welfare or food security. A model is
developed which allows us to analyze different kinds of stochastic disturbances.
Although in an uncertain world dozens of sources of real income fluctuations exist,
we will confine ourselves to only two sources which are claimed to be the most important
in food security issues: (1) fluctuations, in domestic food production and (2) external
fluctuations coming from the world market or from developing countries' food
production (Vald6s, 1981, pp. 4-5). The following simple stochastic partial equilibrium
model is used including one commodity (i.e., grains), two countries (developed country,
developing country) and four agents (domestic consumers and producers, domestic
government, foreign e^ort dem^d). The model ,is/formulated in.general terms and is
especially useful to reve^ the detenninante^^otmean and variance of world market prices
and their interaction with certain price transmission policies.
(12) qjj = f (Py Q) domestic supply function of the EC
(13) qo = g (Pd) domestic demand function of the EC
(14) qED = h (P^ 0) export demand function of the LDC
(15) Ps = k (P^) world price transmission concerning EC producer prices
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(16) Pd = 1(P^) - world price transmission concerning EC consumer prices
(17) ~'Qed = 0 equilibrium condition
where
^,D ~ domestic supply, demand;
qpp = export demand;
P.D,- = producer price, consumer price, world market price;
e, 0 = stochastic disturbance terms related to domestic supply and export demand;
f, g, h, k, 1 = functional parameters
Substituting equations (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16) into equation (17) yields:
(18) f[k(PJ,0]-g[l(PJ]-h[P^0] = O
Following Mood, Graybill, Boes (1983, p. 181) one can derive approximations for the
mean E[*] and the variance var[*] of world market prices from such an implicit
stochastic equation. Thus we have:
(19) E [P^ (0, «)] « P, (0, 0) + var[0] • •P,' (0,
• + h var[0] •dVd0^ •P^ (®, ^)
+ cov[0, 0] •dVd0d0 •P„ (0,
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(20) var [P„ (0, ^)] w var [0]
+ [0] •.
't "P"
..d0 .
A, Pw(3,«r) Pw(5, ^) J+ ;2 cqv [0, 0] •
Using the implicit function i^le for derivations of-P^with respect to the stochastic
disturbances 0 and <p one gets:
(21) E [P„ (0, 0)] « P„ (g, + is var [0]
+ 'i var [0];
+ COV [0, 0]
(22) var [P„ (0, 0)] « var [0] •
+ var [0]
+ 2 cov [0, 0] •
+
f0
DN
h<ft
DN
fe0 • DN - fe • fP.0 • kP„
DN^
hd)<i> ' DN ~ h<6 • hP-(^
DN^
f0 • hP...(6
DN^
f0 • h<b
DN^
where DN = fP^ •kP^ - gP^ • IP^ - hP„ > 0
fPj = marginal supply response to producer price changes
gP^ = marginal demand response to consumer price changes
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kP^ = marginal producer price response to world market price changes
IP^ = marginal consumer price response to world market price changes
hP^ = marginal export demand response to world market price changes
Hence, expected mean and variance of world market prices depend on:
- the variances of both stochastic disturbance terms;
-- the interaction of those tenns (related, unrelated); ^ "
" the nature of the stochastic impact (additive, multiplicative); '
~ various response variables of the agents.
To illustrate this, consider a model which seems to be mpst plausible in agricultural
production. It is characterized by logiinear functions, multiplicative disturbance terms,
and all second derivatives to be sufficiently small. In that case, one can arrive at:
cve^ • + cv/ • - 2 cvg •cv0 •r •q, •Qed
(23) cvp.^ = ^
[e Y + \l\ <3 % + 1^1 qgo ]
where - ' .
e = supply elasticity
T) = demand elasticity
<i) = export demand elasticity
Y = price transmission elasticity with respect to producer prices
- ' 1
0 - price transmission elasticity with respect to consumer prices
r = coefficient of correlation
CV(.) = coefficient of variation of the relevant variable
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From equation (23) one can.derive some interesting results. All other things being
equal; world market prices are the more volatile^ the •
- higher domestic production fluctuations;
-- higher export demand-fluctuations; • •
-- more disturbance, terms are.riegatively correlated;. •' '
" less elastic all responses of private agents; -
-- less world price changes.are allowed'to; be transmitted into ithe domestic market.
In addition, it has to be noted that in case of multiplicative stochastic terms even the
absolute levels of production and export demand matter, to the extent that they affect
the instability of world market prices as weights of the disturbance terms. If a country
completely insulates its domestic market,- as the EC does, and the stochastic disturbances
are unrelated (r = 0), then equation (23) reduces to:
cve^ •q^^ + CV02 •qED^
(24) cvp^^ = , showing an increasing variability
b)
of world market prices compared to open markets, unless price transmission elasticities
are negative in the initial situatioa The price transmission elasticities in equation (23)
allow to include all kinds of trade and domestic policies-(i.e., producer subsidies, quotas,
stock policies, import levies, etc.) and their values and signs are most important for the
impact the EC has on the world market.
Whereas uncertain world market prices affect other exporting and importing
countries* border prices more or less equally, the domestic price, welfare, and food
security effects differ,largely depending on how LDCs transmit those fluctuations to their
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own domestic markets, how risk averse consumers, producers, and taxpayers are, and
how the world market price risk interacts with other risk sources within the country.
Obviously, LDCs can generally not be considered either-as p^sive actors, completely
insulating their national economy, or as enthusiastic adherents of,liberalized trade.
Rather, they react similarly to what politicians in developed countries'.do pursuing their
individual objectives. Assume a policymaker in an-LDCwho seeks to maximize utility
from net governments receipts (GR) and foreign exchange earnings (FE) (see Hammer
and. Knudsen; 1990, p. 392):
(25) U = ;U [FE, GR] Max.!
under the constraint: -
(26) FE (P„: PJ - GR (Pd, P„) - X (Pi) •P, = 0,
where - i j \ •
Pd.w domestic and exogenous world market price
X • "net export quantity^
then the optimal level of domestic prices (control variable) chosen is:
MVpE
1 +
MY
(27) Pd°P*
GR
[! + «•]
where ' - ' . .'
MVpE, gr marginal value offoreign exchange earnings and net government receipts,
respectively ' ' '
• <!)• export supply elasticity with respect to domestic prices
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(For a simultaneous estimation of multiple price transmission equations of type (27) see
• . • T-' ' . . . • '• • '•
Hausner, Schmitz, and von Witzke, 1991, forthcoming.)
• -I • - - .v- • •
Assuming a relative high preference for budget receipts and an export supply
' J' • * ^; a. - I - '.
elasticity of one, implies the typical discrimination policy against agriculture which is
found in most LDCs.
In order to get reasonable price transmission elasticities for individual countries, the
basic constrained maximization approach in (25) to (27) has to be extended to consider
the dynamic nature of policy decisions as well as the cross price effects among
commodity markets (see Hausner, et. al.). Only in that case the welfare and food
security effects of individual agents within the Developing Countries can be properly
derived.
Moreover, it is especially worth noting that external risks (i.e., world market price
risks) do not simply disappear even if trade policy completely isolates the domestic
market. Although consumers and producers are then prevented\from facing external
price-risks,-risk is nevertheless reflected in the.government budget in that c^e, thus
throwing the burden on t^ayers.. Hence,, market insulation generally implies simple
redistribution.df risk. In order to evaluate .both the mean and variance effect of prices
on welfare,-including the risk aversionicomponent, a group-wise accounting could be
used following the.equations (4). and (10) and extended by. an equivalent .taxpayer's term.
(28) ^ « E [U (tt)] + E [U (MM)] + E [U (GR)]
WSum of terms of certainty equivalent real incomes
- • . ^ 1^'
GR Net Government Receipts including the costs of the stabilization policy
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This indicator can be used to calculate the welfare and food security effects when world
market prices -are changed with respect to both their mean and their variance. The
impact of changes in the price variance on agents' welfare has been mostly neglected in
the literature although the price variability has proven to be very sensitive to agricultural
trade policies (Anderson and Tyers, 1990). The EC's agricultural and trade policy
contributes a lot of the price variability on world agricultural markets and thus at least
potentially aggravates the LDC's food security issue. Moreover, it increases the costs of
protecting LDCs domestic consumers and producers from the volatile world market and
where this is not sufficiently successful it might have severe adverse long-term effects on
production and investment decisions in agriculture. Compared to the impacts of the
EC's commodity programs on LDCs the efforts in ECs food aid policy (Franco, 1988)
have only negligible positive effects if at all.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Although the food security discussion has-given more emphasis bri the individual
(household) level as the proper unit of analysis, it still suffers from applying
inappropriate indicators, which are mostly quantity oriented, instead of relying on more
recent results of the literature that it is purchasing power or real income that,matters. In
addition, it has not been made clear so far how food security corresponds to the welfare
status of agents. Since food security can more or less be associated with an uncertain
worid this should at least be reflected in the value function of individuals who are
generally risk averse.
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Therefore, it is proposed in the paper that the measurement of both food security
and welfare should be based on the probability distributioh of adjusted real household
income over time on :a'daily basis/ 'Food security can then-be defined as the probability
of any agent's real income exceeding 'a critical level, whereas the welfare status is
measured as the-^agent's expected utility of this real income. SpeciM'formulas are
developed in this context [equationsX^) and (tO)] which allows one to calculate
producer's and consumer's welfare under price uncertainty and risk aversion separating
the risk response effect as well as the mean income moving effect of price fluctuations.
All'these indicators should be used'when'cornpa'ring'arid evaluating food security or food
insecurity of any agent in whatever regioii. • . .
Applying this concept to th^ paper's question'of how the EG contributes to food
security one can conclude that
•— EC-producers are affected directly by higher and stabilized producer prices
inducing an improved wdfare and^food security position of• the small group of
' fann households; " •' ,
-- EC-consumers, as a large group, suffer from EC*s"price policy in welfare and food
security terms because the price increasing effect is fully transmitted from the
wholesale to the retail level and stable consumer prices for food occur even
without any producer price stabilization;
- the CAP with its strongly isolating character (low price transmission elasticities)
has decreased and destabilized world market prices of agricultural commodities
eroding at least potentially the most important source of real income earnings in
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LDCs, namely agricultural production;
- the CAP-induced negative income and food security effects for producers, have
been even aggrayated by the fact that most LDCs apply sector-specific and
macroeconomic policies which, in addition, heavily discriminate against
agriculture and seyerely endangers the access to enough and healthy food; -
- the potential welfare and food security gains of price level reductions for
consuming and for importing agents are probably compensated by increasing price
and income risks. , -
However, the real effect of the CAP on individual domestic agents in LDCs verv
much depend on how the distorted probability distribution of world market prices is
transmitted'into the country and how this affects agent's real income probability
distribution. Also in that context the paper stresses the importance of the nature of
price transmission and a brief indication is given on how to derive multiple price
transmission equations empirically based on a theoretically reasonable optimization
behavior. The knowledge of vertical, interregional and intertemporal price transmission
seems to be crucial for the analysis of food security issues.
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The Growing Demand for Food QuaUtyi
Implications for Agrlculturol Trade and Policy
Harald von Wltzke
,,^and
Ian Sheldon
Introduction
Throughout history, the prune concern of mankind has been to assure the supply of a
sufficient quantity of food. Quality conslderationa played only a secondary role.
•
However, by tfte early lyjsus ihe fear of perslstem fuuJ scaiUty ImJ Jiaaii^Aied and was
replaced by concerns over food surpluses In the developed world (von Witzke and
Ruttan, 1989). This switch in the perception of food scarcity has been paralleled by a
growing emphasis on food quality.
The growing demand for many food quality components is usually expressed in
the form of a growing demand for food quality standards'. Such standards represent
public goods and thus involve a market failure. The general focus of this'paper is on
both the nature of this market failure arid its central implications for agricultural and
trade policy.
The paper is outlined as follows: in Section 1, a theoretical model of tlie market
for food quality components is presented. In Section 2, the implicatibns of this model
for international trade and agricultural policy are discussed. The paper cbiicludes in
Section 3 with some thoughts on the methodology of trade and policy analysis in the
pfes^ce offood quality standards. •' '•
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1, Hieoretical Background
There appears to be general consensus that many quality components can be left
to market forces. A growing demand for quality will eventually be met through free
^ I '
contracting between private agents both domestically and internationally. However,
there is also a consensus that certain quality components require regulation as a result of
irreversible health consequences of consuming food with negative quality components
and because of asymmetric information on those quality components (Kinsey, 1990j
Kramer^ 1990).
In examining the nature ofmarket failure in the provision offood standards, It is
useful to outline a model of contractual performance originally suggested by Klein and
Leffler (1981). Consider a situation where, each period, consumers purchase a food
product Xwhich embodies a level of quality q. Prior to consumption, individuals are
uncertain about the actual quality of the good but are able to ascertain, by pre-r^rchase
inspection, that it meets aminimum standard, i.e. fruit i» unblemished. Over ihe
consumption period, as the good is experienced, consumers are able to costlessly
communicate information to each other about the good's actual quality. If the quality is
lower than claimed, the seller is punished by non-repeat purchase.
Assume many firms can supply the market with identical techiiology. Further,
assume that the cost function is given as:
C - c(x,q) 4. F(q) ,
where cand Fare variable and fixed costs respectively, Higher quality and quantity
generate higher production costs. Marginal costs increase with quality.
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Focusing on Figure 1, MCq^m and refer to the costs for a good of
minimum quality, whilst and AC^h refer to costs for ahigh-quaUty good, Po and Pj
being the relevant competitive prices. Given that consumers can only observe that a
good is of minimum quality pre-purchase, sellers will alwayi have an incentive to cheat
by selling *3 of the low-quality good,at tKe high-quality price, as the one-period quasi-
rents from cheating outweigh the zero quasi-rents of being honest. Rational consumers
will realize this, and because of the moral hazard, will brJy be willing to pay P^.
Therefore, only low-quality goods 1^11 be produced.
However, there may exist ;a price^above the competitive price Pj that will motivate
firm's to supply high-quality goods, i.e. P, which^generates aprice ;premium such that the
perpetual-quasl-rents from supplying high-quality outweigh the one-period r^nts from
cheating^ In acompetitive equilibrium, firms caimot earn positive profits, hence entry
' would' force the market price below the quality assuring level,^ In order to generate an
equilibrium, Kleln^an^Leffler'argue.that firins will-compete such profits away by
investing in firm-specific assets that iiicur non-salvageable costs, e.g. brand names, logos
and advertising; liis shifts'up4he cost curve for-hlghrquality gpods to AC^h+s. Firms
will not cheat by selling low-quality.at the high price P3 as they will Ipse.fo^^ sales and
incur a capital loss;' Also, investment in,specific.assets acts as a signalling device to
consumers where they arc uncertain about firms'cost structures^ ,
' See Klein and Lcftler (1981) for the precise technical condition.
T' , I. .. f ^ , , ,
»Allen (1984) argues that the Klein and Lefflcr proposition docs not hold if consumers can observe the price
and output ot firms and have information on costs.
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Figure 1 Pricing and Quality Levels
p/C
P.
Given this analysis, how robust is it when the quality index for aproduct is a
vector of characteristics? As Kinsey notes, food quality is a; continuum of characteristics
tanging frdm'the very negative such as unsafe food to positive in terms of taste and
convenience. The combination of the price premium and the repeat-purchase
mechanism would Ukely generate aPareto optimum, for positive quaUty characteristics
such as taste, and we certainly observe food processing firms investing In non-
salvageable, firni-specific assets such as brand names..
However, it seems less likely that contractual assurance can he assured in the case
of negative characteristics. The repeat-purchase mechanism is based on the idea that
consumers can evaluate quality immediately after consumption. When consumption of a
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good bears a health risk, markets fail to^achieve a'^ Pareto optimum- .Honest firms may
invest in firm-specific" assets concerning food safety, but because the repeat-purchase
'mechanism is undermined by consumer uncertainty,'dishonest firms have an incentive to
free-ride and cheat®, ^Herice the-moral hazard problem remains in the case of negative
quality chara'cterikics»-and a competitive ^market will hot provide the necessary quality
information. Of course, information itself^has'the characteristics of a public good
(Stiglitz, 1985).
pven if the repeat-purchase mechanism-works, itwill tend to be sub-optimal in
terms of known risks. For example; salmonella poisoning ,from eggs was not wdely
known to UK consumers until a govefnihent minister publicly claimed that all, eggs sold
in the UK were affected by salmonella,^ generating^an almost immediate boycott, by
comumers, i.ie. all eggs were assumed to be of. low quality...
f
2. Implications for Itade and Policy
• The demand foffood quality, as well as- forfood safety and health standards, Is a
function bf a number of vaHables: Both food quality and standards represent luxury
goods (Falcorii and Roe, 1990). Growing incomes, together with improved knowledge
about health risks have led to a significant growth: in,demand for food quality in the last
decade, XDf course, the dem^d: for food quality-and food quality standards is also a
function of other environmental hazards that consumers are exposed to and of
✓
(nationally divergent) preferences^ '
See Falconi and Roe (1990) for analysis of incentives to firms to distort safely information.
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Moreover, the demand for food safety and health standards is driven by the
growing opportunity cost of human time. Food components are frequently not easy to
recognize. The cost of information on food quality components tends to rise with
increasing opportunity costs of time. In addition, rising opportunity costs of time
stimulate increased demand for food away from home (Senauer, 1979) and, thus, lead to
a growing intake of food for which there is uncertainty about the quality components
(Falconi and Roe, 1990).
As the variables determining the demand.for food quality ^d.food safety and
health standards are different from one country to another, there will be differences in
each country's optimum quality standards (in terms of positive as well as normative
analysis) in the absence of international policy coordination. Such nationally divergent
standards obviously represent barriers to trade. In terms of the previous analysis of
contractual enforcement, this has a number of unplications for policy and welfare
evaluation.
' Barriers to trade in the form of food quality standards could be removed through
international harmonization of food quaUty standards. An international agricultural
' trading system which Is free of barriers to trade represents an international public good.
Asingle country cannot supply itself with such agood except in cooperation with other
countries (Runge, von Witzke and Thompson,. 1989). To. the extent that a,country can
be made better-off by rerhoving barriers to trade, there is an incentive for each country
involved to pursue political strategies which could lead to harmonization of food quality
stan(iard5 among countries.
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However, Internation&l harmonization of:food quality stsmdards may be veiy
difficult to achieve for a variety .of reasuna; Firsti the general problems of public goods
provisions have'to be solved. As is;\vell known, public goods are difficult to provide
efficiently because of incentives for free-riding by the agents involved, and. agreement has
to be achieved over the distribution-of contributions to the cost ,of providing, the^ public
good.
Second, the international distributive problems are aggravated in the case of food
quality st^dards by the fact that the demand;for.both food quality and food-quality
standards is a-positive function of income. However, Incomes^.tend to be unequally
distributed among countries makingJt .more difficult to agree on: uniform food .quality
'standards. ^— - • - T' " ' ' ; ^ ^
Third, the growing importance offood quality standards, will also re-define trade
relations between the developed and-the'developing world;- Food e;^orting countries are
likely to face more barriers to tradet-as developed countries introduce ,additional and
tighten existing food safety* and healtli standards. iLess developed countries may have
problezhs. meeting standards set by.wealthy countries because,, in many cases, new
prbduction techniques are human capital intensive; human capital, however, is scarce in
most low income countries. Moreover, production technologies that meet the.standards
developed in wealthy cbuhtries, may not be.effident under either.the climatic conditions
or relative factor prices In developing:countries.- A further ditnension of this problem is
that some developed food exporting nations may opt to constrain domestic, sales offoods
/
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to those that meet domestic standards but allow the production of belowrstandard foods
for export to other countries with less restrictive regulation.
Fourth, the growing demand for food quality tends to favor political coj^tions
between farm interest groups and consumers. In developed countries, the Influential
minority of agricultural producers, seeking protection from foreign competition may find
increasingly attractive coalition partners in consumers seeking protection from food and
related health risks via food quality standards.
' Finally, (nationally divergent) food quality standards may gain in Importance as a
substitute for more traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers, to Uade. .Progress in
international negotiations on amore liberal International agricultural trade, such as those
in the GATT, may have been slow but they have contributed to significant policy
adjustments both In the United States and the European Community (EC). In both
countries, agricultural price supports have been reduced in real terms In recent years. Of
course, if one instrument is taken away from an influential interest group, such as
farmers in developed countries, its political power Is usually not brokea If traditional
forms of agricultural income support continue, to lose their importance, agricultural
interest groups will find substitutes. Again food quality standards and acoaliUon.wlth
consumers Is Ukely to be an attractive option.
For the reasons outlined, it Is expected that food quaUty standards will play an
increasingly Important role as non-tariff barriers to international trade (see also Runge,
1990). Recently, there has been agrowing incidence of International disputes over food
qual/ty and food quality standards. There was disagreement between the EC and the
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United States over the 'use-of growth.^hormbne in beef production and the Community
threatened to ban the import of all beef^firom the United States for, this reason. Also,
the EC how requires^that foreign meat processlng.plants meet EC standards. Recently,
the'EG significantly reduced the number of»certified.plants» causing the United States to
threaten retaliation. ' - ' i
in reality then; there are apparently serious-impediments to the. harmonization of
food quality standards which are likely to prove difficult to overcome. This can be
demonstrated by the experience over time ofboth theUnited States and the-EC. In the
case ot the United States, despite being a nation state for 200 years, there, are still
numerous interstate trade barriers. Many of them are based on differences in food
quality and related standards.
In the case of the EC, one of the central objectives of the scheduled completion
of the internal mwket by the end of499,2 is tO'remove all interns^ barriers to trade. It
has how become apparent that the Cominumty.will fcdlvto adopt a imifprm set of
standards before'the 1992'deadliriei It'seems'(Swinbank, 1990 and Gray,1990) that the
EC has in fact adopted the principle of"mutual recognition" in its approach to food
standards harmonization. Products manufactured and sold within a particular EC
country; and those-imported from a^non-EC country,..arc subject to that country's set of
quality standards, whilst products imported from other member states/only haye to meet
the standards set by their relevant governments. Therefore, the.EC Commission appears
to be following a poli^ of minimum standards. ''*3
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. In terms of the previous analysis of contractual enforcement, if the concept of
"mutual recognition" were applied to trade between a wider set of countries than the EC,
it would have a number of implications for welfare, evaluation. First, if individual
countries set differing food safety and health standards which translate into sunk costs
for firms, there will be a range of qualities ofgoods that can b.e freely traded. This may
be beneficial if there is a non-uniform distribution amongst consumers of the willingness
to pay for quality. It also means that price differences for a particular food product will
be observed for reasons other than transport costs. However,, a range of differing
product Standards for the same type of product may interfere witii the signalling
mechanism ofa particular country's set of standards and serve to increase consumer
uncertainty.
Second, if the process of harmonization of international food quality standards
focusses on a minimum set ofstandards, those firms from countries .with higher standards
may have an incentive to-demand that domestic standards be lowered in order to allow
them to compete with imports that embody a lower,set of standards.
3. Summary and ConcluBlonj
Using asimple model of contractual enforcement, jt has-been shown in this paper that
asymmetric information on quality components is sufficient for amarket determined,
quality-enforcement mechanism not to work in the case of food safety, and herice safety ^
standards may have to be set by public institutions . In this context, an attempt has been
made' to analyze the implications for international agricultural trade and policy of the
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growing demand for food quality. This demand will reault in agrowing abundance of
(nationally divergent).food-quality.sUndards, Many of them will act as barriers to trade.
Political coalitions between consumers and agricultural producers demanding protection
are likely to gain,in importance, which will add a new.dimensiOT to attempts at
international agricultural and trade policy coordination such as those in the GATT.
The growing demand for food safety and health standards also raises new
methodological problems for which,,as,y^t. there ai;e no agreed answers. Specific^y, the
'• r • ^ ' '
following issues are mentioned:
,If aPareto optimum for each country requires them to set nationally divergent
standards (public goods), free trade may have to be abandoned as the reference
situation for trade and policy andysis, so what h it teplaced by?
: Kharmonization of standards is desirable,for at least-some countries, how
should and how will countries cdbperato in this.regMd? .
-As the units of analysis are not individual econoi^c agents, the political ^,
econonuc process needs to be understo.od both at the domestic and'international
level..
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OVERVIEW
Paul Gallagher
Food security refers to a country's ability to provide food arid avoid
critical shortages even under the most^adverse conditions." Indeed, some form
of public intervention is justified when an individual's market purchases"will
not satisfy basic human needs. Sometimes, it is useful to view food security
as an income problem.' In particular, constimer demand at a low income level
(D(p,yi)) may not satisfy a minimum level (D*) at a normal price (Pn) (see
figure 1). In wealthy countries, food security mi^t usefully be defined as a
price, or supply instability, problem, 'in figure' 1, a consumer'with
sufficient income (Yg) will consume in excess of the minimxim level except at
an extreme price level(P,). Most participants and presenters seem to agree
with these basic ideas.
However, diverse means of achieving food security goals have been
proposed during these discussions. In particular, targeted subsidies or
income augmentation for low income groups were favored fot developing
countries with adequate total market supply, such as India. In Africa,
production increases through research and subsidy were mentioned for rising
incomes and economic development. High production levels and self-sufficiency
rates were also advocated for Japan, mainly on concern that the trading system
could break down. Improvements in the trading system were emphasized by
exporting country participants. CAP reform would improve stability and the
risk of using world markets. Improved standards could improve market access
for developing countries and assure safe food for developed countries.
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Overall, trade-minded analyses of a domestic policy concern for importing
and developing countries have been provided. Yet trade talks typically
emphasize other policy instruments for food security improvement:diversification,
stocks and long term trade agreements. There are differing perceptions
concerning the severity of past trade interruptions. For instance, price
variation was much more extreme within Japan^ than on the world market during
the U.S. soybean embargo of the early seventies (see figure 2). Formal
research might shed some light on the prospects for a trade-based solution to
the food security problem. The trading system probably will not fail if
economic conditions improve and, all countries share in this improvement.
Energy should be devoted to improving the performance of the trading system
and reducing the chance that it fails instead of planning for its failure.
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Figure 1. Food Insecurity for an Individual Consumer
Price. (P)
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Figure 2. The Price of U.S. Soybeans at Various Locatio
ns
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Source: Ohno, K. and P. Gallagher, "Measuring Market Power for Marketing Firms:
The Case of Japanese Soybean Markets," Contributed Paper for the XXI
International Conference of Agricultural Economists, August 1991.
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